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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL BAIRAS, 
Plain tiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
LANARD JOHNSON and Case No. 9599 
NORMAN CRAM, Co-Admin-
istrators of the Estate of 
Philip G. Fulstow, deceased, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'TS 
The Appellant will be referred to as the Plain-
tiff and the Respondents as Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for person~al injuries upon 
Plaintiff's Complaint and for wrongful death and 
property damage upon Defendant's Counterclaim. 
The Defendants do not agree with the state-
ment of facts of the Appellant and view it necessary 
to restate the facts rather than take specific excep-
tion to those advanced by Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court denied motions for continuance and 
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for change of venue filed and brought before the 
court for the first time on the morning of com-
mencement of the trial (upon the third trial setting 
for this case) when the jury was present and the 
defendants ready with their witnesses to proceed 
(R. 50, 83). 
Upon such denial the Plaintiff commenced pre-
sentation of evidence and offered a deposition of 
the Plaintiff as an exhibit (R. 87). Upon the court's 
ruling against introducing the deposition in totality 
and as an exhibit rather than publishing it subject 
to proper objections as provided by the Rules (R. 
89), Plaintiff withdrew the proposed exhibit (R. 92) 
and refused to proceed further with the case calling 
no other witnesses ( R. 90) . 
Upon motion of Defendants the Court dismissed 
the complaint, and upon motion of Defendants in 
order to conclude the entire action, dismissed their 
counterclaim without prejudice (R. 91). 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL 
The Appellant does not so state in his brief, 
but we assume the appeal is from the rulings rather 
than from the dismissal. There was no evidence 
introduced a:t the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has stated the facts in the lig·ht most 
favorable to himself; has omitted many facts; and 
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has grossly overstated all those facts he believes 
favorable to him, particularly those found in the 
affidavits which have never been filed or served 
in time to allow contradicting or repudiating affi-
davits by the Defendants and which have been self-
serving, conclusive, and largely hearsay. The facts 
must be viewed in light most favorable to Defend-
ants; nevertheless, accepting them wholly and upon 
their face value, without any advantage to Respon-
dents, they are as follows: 
Defendants' intestate, Philip G. Fulstow, was 
killed in an automobile accident in Coconino County, 
Arizon·a, on July 5, 1960. Defendants were appoint-
ed his administrators and regularly published notice 
to creditors. On the next to last day allowed for pre-
sc:ntation, Plaintiff filed a claim for $500,000.00 
for personal injuries. This was denied immediately 
by the administrators and on the next to last day 
permitted by the Statute of Limitations, Plaintiff 
sued. (Plaintiff's Brief Page 2). Except for this 
action all accountings in the estate of the decedant 
were, in November 1960, in a condition to be settled, 
estate and inheritance taxes paid, general creditors 
satisfied, and the heirs of the decedent distributed 
the residue (R. 22, 2'3). The defendants counter-
claimed and the matter was at issue on March 27, 
1961 (R. 8). 
The Defendants admit that, as they are accused 
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in Plaintiff's brief, (Page 2), they asked for an early 
trial setting. The court fixed the trial date for June 
15th. Reluctantly, counsel agreed to a postponement 
to accommodate Plaintiff's attorney until June 28th 
( R. 20-2·3). 
The Plaintiff was hospitalized in Los Angeles 
at the time and there is no showing that his condi-
tion changed any from the time of filing the com-
plaint and until this continuance or that it worsened 
between the time of this continuance and the one 
sought again on June 26th, or the one later sought 
on September 20th. 
On June 22, 1961, there was served upon one 
of Defendant's attorneys, unsupported by any affi-
davit or showing except generalized statements of 
counsel, a motion for continuance upon the ground 
Plaintiff was unable to travel (R. 16, 1'7). The 
motion was set for argument at Richfield on June 
26th by the Court in order to dispose of it prior to 
the jury trial set for the 2'8th ( R. 24). Defendants 
filed an affidavit setting forth the reasons why 
they opposed and the prejudice that would result 
from any continuance ( R. 20-23). 
On the morning of the June 26th hearing, De-
fendants for the first time S'aw the affidavits sup-
porting the motion for continuance (R. 25). Those 
affidavits assured the court that the Plaintiff would 
be able to travel and attend the trial in approxi-
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mately three months (R. 19). Plaintiff was and is 
represented by counsel in Los Angeles who called 
the Judge and assured him that the Plaintiff could 
travel in TWO months (R. 27). 
At the hearing on June 26, 1961, on the Plain-
tiff's motion for a continuance, it was stipulated 
by Plaintiff and Defendants that trial would be set 
on September 20, 1961 and the case would be tried 
on that date without any other continuance: (R. 
28-29). 
"The Court: September 20, 21 and 22 
will be the trial dates with the understanding 
that if the Plaintiff is not physically able to 
be present, that the attorneys for the Plaintiff 
will in due season take, of course, his deposi-
tion~ vvhich deposition will be used at the trial, 
which is contemplated under the Rules. Now 
is that understood? 
Mr. Burns: It is understood, Your Hon-
or, and we will so comply. 
Mr. Chamberlain: Could we have a pro-
vision in the Order that we be given at least 
ten days' notice of the taking of any deposi-
tion? 
Mr. Burns: So stipuated. 
The Court: Let the order so show. You 
will prepare the order. 
Mr. Chamberlain: Yes, I will prepare 
the order. 
The Court: You will be responsible for 
getting the information to your co-counsel? 
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Mr. Burns: Mr. Goller is in California. 
The Court: With the understanding 
that this is a setting, for example, which the 
court will not [over] turn and if per chance 
the Plaintiff cannot be present, the deposi-
tion of the Plaintiff will be taken and counsel 
for the Defendants will be entitled to ten 
days' notice of the taking of that deposition, 
if it should be taken." (R. 28-29) 
It should be noted at this point that prior to 
the hearing at Richfield on June 26th the Defend-
ants had agreed to make themselves available in 
Los Angeles for taking of Plaintiff's deposition for 
use by him at the trial ( R. 58) . The Plain tiff ac-
knowledges (R. 59) that a telegram was received 
offering them that opportunity ( R. 58), which they 
nevertheless declined. 
A discovery deposition (Exhibit 1) was taken 
by the Defendants on June 24, 1961, in Downey, 
California, and at that deposition all of the evidence 
which the Plaintiff could have produced by his own 
testimony at the trial was elicited. He was asked 
a number of questions by his own counsel (Deposi-
tion Pages 46-51) in the cour~se of which Plaintiff's 
counsel made an intense effort to correct or change 
some damaging testimony regarding identity of the 
driver of the vehicle produced in interrogation of 
the Plaintiff on direct examination (Exhibit 1, Pg. 
46, 4 7. cf. Pg. 2·7, Lines 2-20). 
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Between the first date set for trial (June 14, 
1961) and the last date to which trial was continued 
(September 20, 1961) two witnesses for the De-
fendant, Harold I. Bowman, Jr., and Alvin Judd, 
died (R. 70). 
On September 20, 1961 the Defendants with 
thei1· witnesses were in Court and a jury summoned 
and in the box, ready for the trial ( R. 83). For 
the first time there was filed a Motion for Change 
of Venue which had not been served on counsel (R. 
50). Plaintiff's counsel admitted that they had ob-
tained signed petitions on ·September 2nd to the ef-
fect that a travelling salesman visited service sta-
tions in and about the Kanab area and the indivi-
duals were to have said that Fulstow was killed and 
ti1e Plaintiff, Paul B·airas, was the driver of the 
car and he, too, should have been killed (R. 62, 
34-38). The court denied the Motion for Change of 
Venue on the ground th·at it had not been timely 
made or timely served ( R. 6'2) , and on the ground 
that the showing was insufficient ( R. 62, 63). (A 
ruling justified by the ability to qualify and swear 
a jury shortly thereafter) . 
Plaintiff's counsel also moved the court for 
another continuance on the ground that the Plain-
tiff was still not physically capable of appearing in 
court ( R. 65). This motion had not been previously 
filed nor had the motion or any accompanying affi-
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davits been served upon counsel (R. 54, 55). Sup .. 
porting the motion for a continuance was the affi-
davit of Dr. C. H. Imes who, very significantly, is 
the same physician upon whose affidavit the next 
previous continuance had been moved (R. 18-19), 
and who had stated that Plaintiff would be able 
to travel within two or three months. He was the 
doctor Plaintiff's counsel should have been looking 
to for information regarding the ·ability of the Plain-
tiff to travel. Instead they sought this same phy-
sician for a new affidavit to gain further continu-
ances in disregard of their prior stipulation and 
contravention of the court's order of June 26, 1961. 
Very significant and controlling I~anguage of 
this new affidavit of the physician is found in the 
following statement: 
''The present condition of PAUL BAIRAS is 
one of improvement, however, affiant nor the 
hospital would accept responsibility for a trip 
by said PAUL BAIRAS at the present time 
inasmuch as his physical condition still does 
not permit the rigors of transportation to 
Utah. Further, surgery of a genitro-urinary 
nature is scheduled for Mr. B'airas this week 
which would further make his presence in 
Utah impossible from a medical standpoint." 
( R. 41). 
Now here in the record is there shown any at-
tempt on the part of coun<Sel for the Plaintiff to in-
quire into the condition of the Plaintiff to deter-
mine whether or not his deposition should be taken. 
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This is evident from the affidavits his counsel drew 
for the Plaintiff himself (R. 109-111), and from 
the affidavit of Plaintiff's California counsel, N a-
than Goller ( R. 43-44) . 
After long discussion between the Court and 
counsel ( R. 49-73), the trial court determined that 
the Plaintiff was not entitled to a further continu-
ance; that the court's order of June 26th (stipulated 
by both sides) had not been observed nor had the 
slightest attempt been made to comply with it; that 
no diligence had been shown at all in attempting to 
obtain Plaintiff's testimony by deposition and that 
the motion for a third continuance should, in the 
exercise of the Court's discretion, be denied (R. 57, 
58, 73). 
A jury was examined on the voir dire of each 
individual and eight jurors were qualified having 
stated under oath that they could try the case fairly 
and impartially and that there were no associations, 
relationships, or pre-conceived notions which would 
prejudice their consideration, deliberation, and final 
verdict. (The voir dire exmaination of the indivi-
dual jurors was not reported). A motion to strike 
the jury panel was made by the Plaintiff and denied 
by the Court ( R. 80) . 
Trial commenced and the Plaintiff attempted 
to introduce in evidence in its entirety the deposi-
tion taken of the Plaintiff, Paul Bairas, at Downey, 
California, on June 24, 1961. Objection was made 
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by Defendants to proceeding in this manner, the 
Defendants claiming they had a right to make ob-
jection to inadmissible evidence in the deposition 
( R. 87). The court ruled that the deposition could 
be published and used in the manner provided by t'he 
Rules, subject to proper objections, but that it could 
not be used in its entirety as an exhibit ( R. 89) . 
The Plaintiff called no witnesses (R. 90) and 
stated th'at: 
Mr. Burns: "Your Honor, in the 
light of the fact that the only evidence before, 
or at the disposal of the Plaintiff is the deposi-
tion taken in behalf of the Defendants by At-
torney Rex Hanson, and this is the only means 
of eliciting the testimony of the Plaintiff and 
in light of the court's ruling that the testi-
mony so given is subject to all of the objec-
tions that were asked, the Plaintiff is unable 
to go on further and the Plaintiff rests." (R. 
90) 
Upon the Plaintiff resting, the Court, upon 
Defendants' motion, dismissed the Plaintiff's com-
plaint with prejudice and at the request of the De-
fendants, dismissed their counterclaim without pre-
judice ( R. 9'2). · 
The Court entered findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, an·d a judgment accordingly (R. 95-98), 
and after receiving and denying a motion for a new 
trial and hearing objections to the findings and par-
tially granting some of the objections, entered 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I (a) 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE WAS NOT IN ERROR 
BECAUSE: 
(a) THE COURT ACTED WITHIN THE PROPER 
EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETIONARY POWERS 
WHICH ARE NOT SU'BJECT TO REVIEW UN-
LESS PATENTLY ARBITRARY. 
Under the provisions of Rule 40 (b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the following provision is con-
tained relative to the postponement or continuance 
of a trial setting : 
"Upon motion of a party, the court may, in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be j~tst, including the payment of costs occa-
sioned by such postponement, postpone a trial 
or proceeding upon good cause shown. If the 
motion is made upon the ground of the ab-
sence of evidence such motion shall also set 
forth the materiality of the evidence expected 
to be obtained and shall show that due dili-
gence has been used to procure it ... " (Em-
phasis added) 
The provision cited has found frequent appli-
cation. In the case of Sharp vs. Gianulakis, 63 Utah 
249, 225 P. 337, the court stated. 
"In the absence of any showing that the court 
abused its discretion (in denying a motion 
for a continuance) this court is not author-
ized to disturb those orders or to reverse the 
judgment by reason of the same." 
11 
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Similarly, in the case of Lancino vs. Smith, 
36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914, a complaint had been 
filed in August of 1907, and during February of 
1908 the case was set for trial April 2, 1908. On 
the 31st of March, by consent of the attorneys for 
both parties, the trial was postponed to April 10, 
1908. On that date, the attorneys for the defense 
filed a motion, supported by an ,affidavit, for a 
further continuance. The affidavit, in substance, 
stated that the defendant was unable to attend the 
trial and that gross injustice would result if he 
were required to proceed to trial. The court granted 
the motion and continued the case until the 16th 
day of April. Again, the motion for a continuance 
was renewed on the same ground that existed at the 
prior hearing. The court denied a further continu-
ance. On appeal the question was whether or not 
the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
the Motion for Continuance. 
The trial court held that since there was no 
valid affidavit before it to sustain or support the 
second Motion to Continue, all that was before the 
court was the statement of the defendant's attorney. 
The prior affidavit had spent its force and was not 
effective to support the second motion. The Supreme 
Court in sustaining the trial court, determined that 
there was nothing tangible upon which a ruling 
could be properly founded, an·d further, defendant 
12 
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had not exercised due diligence as required and 
necessary to entitle him to a further continuance. 
"The right and power to postpone trials for 
cause, and to regulate the business of trial 
courts by the courts them,gelves so as to sub-
serve public as well as private interests, must, 
in the nature of thin'gs, be to a very large 
extent at least, be left to their sound discre-
tion." 
While the Supreme Court indicated that upon 
the record they may be "greatly inclined" to the 
view that the motion for continuance should have 
been granted it observed that: 
" ... this is far from saying that we would 
be justified in holding that the trial court 
abused the discretion vested in it by law, 
and unless we can say that it is clear that 
it did, then its judgment and not ours must 
prevail.'' 
See also the case of McGrath v. T,allent, 7 Utah 
256, 2'58, 26 P. 57 4, where this court sustained a 
ruling of the trial court denying a continuance be-
cause the defendant was ill and unable to attend 
trial. A statement of counsel was not considered 
sufficient to require a continuance. 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs moved for 
a third continuance of the case on the morning of 
trial without having previously filed and served a 
written motion or supporting affidavits as required 
by Rule 6'(d), U.R.C.P. That rule provides: 
13 
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"A written motion, other than one which may 
be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing 
thereon shall be served not later than five 
days before the time specified for the hear-
ing, unless a different period is fixed by these 
rules or by order of the court. Such an order 
may for cause shown be made on ex parte 
application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with 
the motion; and, except as otherwise provided 
in Rule 59 (c), opposing affidavits may be 
served not later than one day before the hear-
ing, unless the court permits them to be served 
at some other time." 
The manifest purpose of the rule is salutory. 
It requires the filing of notice in sufficient time to 
permit the opposing party to prepare himself for 
hearing on the motion. It affords the opposing party 
an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the affi-
davits filed in support of the motion and to file 
counter-affidavits if found necess~ary. The defend-
ants in this case were greatly prejudiced by the 
untimely filing of the motion because none of the 
safeguards anticipated by the rule were made avail-
able to them. There was no opportunity for the de-
fendants to investigate the averments contained in 
the affidavits filed in support of the motion, and 
the right to file counter-affidavits, being the equiv-
alent of cross-examination, was effectively denied. 
An affidavit which is untimely filed in support 
of a motion must be stricken. Canning vs. Star 
Publishing Company, 19 F. R. D. 281, (Del. 1956), 
14 
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If the motion is stripped of the proposed affidavits, 
it stands unsupported. In this connection the case 
of Lancino vs. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914, is 
controlling, because affidavits which had been filed 
previously in support of a motion for continuance 
had "spent their force", an·d there was no basis 
upon which the court could properly found a deci-
sion to further continue the case. McGr~ath vs. Tal-
lent, supra. 
Independent of other considerations, which will 
be presented hereafter, the trial court did 11ot "clear-
ly" abuse its discretion in denying a third continu-
ance of the trial of thi\s matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I(b) 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR CONTIN'UANCE WAS N·OT IN ERROR 
BECAUSE: 
(a) .* * * 
(b) THE STIPULATION AND COURT'S ORDER 
OF JUNE 26, 1961, LE·FT N'O ALTERNATIVE BUT 
TO PROCEE'D WITH THE TRIAL AS AGREED 
BETWEEN COUNSEL AND AS ORDERED BY 
THE COURT. 
A Demand for Jury Trial was made by plain-
tiff's counsel on the 15th day of May, 1961. The 
trial was set by the court on the 15th day of June, 
1961, but on motion of plaintiff's counsel, and for 
the purpose of accommodating him, a stipulation 
was entered into whereby the date was continued 
15 
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for approximately two weeks to the 28th day of 
June, 1961. During the intervening period, the plain-
tiff's deposition was taken by one of the attorneys 
for the defendant on the 24th of June, 1961, in 
Downey, California. Plaintiff'·s California attorney 
was present. The evidence was fully developed and 
plaintiff's attorney took the opportunity to examine 
his client fully and attempted to rehabilitate the 
testimony given by his client because he considered 
it damaging (Exhibit 1, Pages 46-47, 46-51). At 
the time of the argument on the Motion to Continue 
the Trial Setting a second time, which was held on 
the 26th of June, 1961, in Richfield, Utah, in order 
to dispose of the matter prior to the jury trial set 
for the 28th of that month, the defendants agreed 
to make themselves available in Los Angeles for 
taking of the plaintiff's deposition for use by him 
at the trial. The plaintiff acknowledged that a tele-
gram was received for defendant's counsel afford-
ing them this opportunity (R. 59), but it was, 
nevertheless ignored. 
Following the hearing of June 26, 1961, the 
Court granted a further continuance to September 
20, 1961, with a condition that no further postpon-
ment would be permitted. In the event the plaintiff 
could not be physically present, his attorneys were 
ordered to arrange for the taking of his deposition 
to be used at the trial as contemplated under the 
16 
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Rules of Utah Civil Procedure (See R. 28, 29). In 
view of two previous continuances, the conditions 
s2t by the court were reasonable and clearly within 
the contemplation of Rule 40 (b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Mr. Burns, one of the attorneys 
for the plaintiff in response to the Court's inquir-
ing concerning the conditions of the continuance, 
l'esponded : 
"It is understood, your Honor, and we 
will so comply." (R. '28) 
In support of the Motion to Continue the trial 
setting of June 28, 1961, an Mfidavit signed by Dr. 
C. H. Imes, and dated June 26, 1961, was filed 
with the Court at the hearing wherein he expressed 
his opinion that: 
"Mr. Bairas' physical condition would 
not, at this time, permit transportation ... 
nor his extended presence in court or his resi-
dence in facilities tlnequipped to take care of 
his present condition. Affiant is of the be-
lief that in approximately three months, Mr. 
Bairas will be in sufficient physical condition 
so as to permit transportation to Utah, his 
presence in court, and his residence outside of 
'a hospital while in Utah." (R. 19) 
Even though the plaintiff's attorneys were 
aware of the precarious physical condition of their 
client, they did not take the minimum precaution of 
complying with the Court's order and obtain his 
deposition for presentation at the trial in the event 
17 
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his health prevented him from personally attending. 
Plaintiff's attorneys knew their client was under 
pen.alty of having the case dismissed in the event 
they did not fortify themselves with plaintiff's 
deposition. This reasonable precaution was not 
taken. The case was continued to September 20, 
1961, one week less than three months from the 
previous trial date. It is evident that the Court had 
given them the full measure of their request in post-
poning the trial date in accordance with their wish 
an·d as supported by the affidavit of Dr. Imes. 
Dr. Imes, who signed the affidavit in support 
of the Motion of Continuance on the 26th of June, 
1961, is charged with knowledge that a continuance 
of the June 2·8, 1961, trial date was granted, inas-
much as he claims to have been in direct super-
vision of the plaintiff. Even so, he scheduled an 
operation for plaintiff in the same week of the trial, 
which his own affidavit had assisted in establishing. 
Without giving notification to the Court, or to de-
fendant's attorneys, Plaintiff's California counsel 
again secured an Affidavit from this same doctor 
which stated essentially the same facts he had pre-
viously attested to, and indicated that the physical 
condition of Mr. Bairas would not, in his opinion, 
permit his transportation to Utah. No claim was 
made by him that the surgery was of an emergency 
nature or that the trip could not have been made 
without it. Nor is there any showing that the sur-
18 
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gery could not have been performed at an earlier 
date, and in sufficient time to have permitted his 
s~hedt1led attendance at the trial. 
The second affidavit of Dr. Imes was made on 
the 18th day of September, 1961, only two days be-
fore the trial was to commence. It was not served 
upon the defendants until the day of Trial. This was 
in complete disregard of Rule 6'(d) which requires 
that the affidavits be filed with the Motion not less 
than five days before the hearing on the Motion. 
No opportunity was presented to the defendants to 
have an independent doctor examine the condition 
of Mr. Bairas to determine whether or not the affi-
davits submitted by Dr. Imes were well founded. 
No opportunity was afforded to present countering 
affidavits of any sort. Indeed, the good faith of Dr. 
Imes and plaintiff's California counsel is thrown 
in to serious question. 
The requirement of the trial court that the 
plaintiff appear in person and testify concerning 
his claim or present his testimony by deposition was 
not unreasonable and is within the contemplation 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This court 
held in the case of Oberhansley vs. Traveler's Com-
pany, 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P. 2d 1093 (1956), that 
it is not prejudicial to a party to require him to 
present the evidence of a material witness upon 
deposition. There the court found that the defend-
19 
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ant had an opportunity to take a deposition of a 
material witness before trial, but failed to do so. 
He could not thereafter justifiably complain that 
the testimony was not available to him. 
In this ca~Se the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against 
the defendant for one-half million dollars, had made 
a demand for trial, and on their own motion had 
gained two previous trial dates. The court made 
reasonable conditions for a third continuance well 
in advance of the new trial date, which the pllaintiff 
chose to ignore. It is not a sufficient answer, as 
contended by plaintiff's California attorney, that 
he anticipated Mr. Bairas would be well enough to 
attend the trial in September. This was also expected 
in June three months before. Minimum diligence 
was not being exercised in failing to follow plain-
tiff's physieal condition and treatment close enough 
to advi'Se the Court and the defendants in sufficient 
time to obtain his deposition. Defendant's attorneys 
had actually suggested this to Plaintiff and agreed 
to make necessary arrangements to be present in 
California for that purpose (R. 59). It would ap-
pear that defendants were more diligent in the 
plaintiff's cause than was his California counsel, 
since defendant's telegram suggesting these arrange-
ments was ignored by him (R. 58-59). 
In the Connecticut case of Allen vs. Chase, 71 
.,.I• 
A. 367, the plaintiff consented to a two day con-
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tinuance on defendant's motion with the under-
standing that if the defendant was still prevented 
by illness from appearing in court, his counsel would 
take his deposition and the trial would proceed. 
When the trial resumed, the defendant's counsel 
moved for another continuance and when this was 
denied, he prepared an affidavit stating what he 
believed the defendant would testify to if he were 
present in court. The Supreme court held that there 
was no abuse of discretion in requiring the trial 
to proceed, there being no justifiable excuse for 
failing to keep the original agreement as to the 
taking of the deposition. 
Similarly, in the case of Roseberry vs. Scott, 
244 P. 1063, (Kansas, 1926), defendant's motion to 
continue the trial was denied in the absence of a 
showing that any effort had been made to take the 
defendant's deposition. It was shown that at the 
previous term of court the plaintiff had consented 
to a continuance on the defendant's stipulation that 
the cause could be tried in the next term. 
In the Mississippi case of Worsham vs. McLeod, 
11 So. 107, the plaintiff, who was ill at the time 
of filing the complaint was charged with the re-
sponsibility of procuring his testimony by deposi-
tion. His failure to do so and a resulting denial of 
his motion to continue was not found an abuse of 
discretion where it was shown he had an opportunity 
to obtain it. 
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The rule established in the Oberhansley case, 
which indicates that a p~arty is not prejudiced in 
being required to present material testimony on 
deposition, considered with Plaintiff's responsibility 
of presenting his claim timely and on reasonable 
conditions, is a sufficient basis upon which to sus-
tain the ruling of the trial court in denying plain-
tiff's motion for a further continuance. The plain-
tiff's failure to properly prepare himself for trial 
when viewed in the light of the prior continuances 
and the reasonable conditions placed thereon, left 
the court with no altern~ative but to deny a request 
f'or a further postponement of the inevitable. 
POINT II. 
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ERROR AND AN ABUSE 
OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION HAD IT GRANTED 
THE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE BECAUSE OF 
RESULTING SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE TO THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
Material prejudice resulted to the defendants 
because of the previous continuances granted by the 
trial court. In his affidavit, opposing the motion 
for the continuance heard June 26, 1961, Ken Cham-
berlain, an attorney for defendants, testified that 
the estate of Phillip G. Fulstow, deceased was then 
in a condition to be closed, and had been for three 
months prior thereto, pending the disposition of this 
action ( R. 22) . General creditors of the dece~ased had 
not and could not be paid and distribution to the 
22 
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heirs could not be made until disposition of this 
action. Interest and penalties for non-payment of 
taxes due under Inheritance and Estate Tax Laws 
began to accrue July 5, 1961 (R. 22). In addition, 
defendants have twice been put to the expense and 
inconvenience of preparing for trial. 
However, even greater prejudice has resulted 
to defendants because of the repeated continuances 
of the trial. The testimony of two material witnes-
ses has been lost. On June 28, 1961, defendants 
were fully prepared to proceed with trial ; never-
theless, a continuance was granted to September 
20, 1961, over the objection of defendants. During 
the intervening period, Mr. Alvin Jones, a police-
man and n1aterial witness for defendants, who was 
at the scene of the accident, died. Also Harold Bow-
man, Jr., a defense witness who observed both plain-
tiff and deceased shortly before the fatal accident, 
passed away ( R. 70). This testimony is now for-
ever lost and serious prejudice has resulted to de-
fendants. Further continuances would only increase 
the inconvenience, expense 'and prejudices which had 
already occurred. 
Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate the claimed 
arbitrary action of the trial court in failing to grant 
a further continuance because the matter proceeded 
to trial with unusual speed. (Appellants' brief, 
Pages 8, 9, 11, 12, 16). He fails to point out, how-
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ever, that the fatal accident occurred July 5, 1960, 
and the filing of the complaint was delayed until 
March 9, 1961, scarcely within the time permitted 
by law. A Demand for Jury Trial was then made 
by him, May 15, 1961. With this background, plain-
tiff's argument that the trial setting of September 
20, 1961, justified a further continuance, after two 
previous requested continuances had been granted, 
rings hollow indeed. 
Plaintiff has not suggested, however, that the 
trial dates precluded him from properly preparing 
his case for trial. His California attorney, whose 
office is only a short distance from Rancho Los 
Amigos, where plaintiff was receiving medical and 
hospital care, was fully aware of his physical limi-
tations. There is no testimony in the record that 
plaintiff's condition is ever expected to be one of 
material improvement. But as early as June 24, 
1961, Plaintiff's deposition was taken in Downey, 
California by one of defendant's ~attorneys where 
his testimony was recorded in 54 pages of certified 
tran1script. If, as claimed by plaintiff that his con-
dition has been one of improvement, he certainly 
was not less able to assist his own counsel in pre-
paring his case for trial September 20, 1961. 'There 
is no evidence that a further continuance would 
substantially alter plaintiff's inability to p·erson-
ally attend trial. While hils atjtorney may have pre-
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ferred his personal presence at trial to that of his 
deposition, such is not a basis for assigning an 
arbitrary abuse of trial court discretion in denying 
a third continuance. The ideal of justice is a two 
way street and contemplates consideration of the 
defendants' rights as well as those of the plaintiff: 
Defendants were required to prep'are and defend a 
lawsuit against a dead man. His testimony and the 
possibility of ever preserving it through deposition 
died with him. It has never been the attempt of the 
decedent's administrators to deny the plaintiff his 
statutory right to a fair opportunity to litigate his 
claim. Defendants, insofar as preparing and de-
fending the claim is concerned, were prejudiced in 
preparing a defense, from the inception of this 
action. In addition, plaintiff's delay has resulted 
in the loss of two additional material witnesses 
through death. The previous continuances resulted 
in irreparable prejudice to the defendants, and plain-
tiff now urges that such be not only condoned by 
this court, but continued. It is submitted that plain-
tiff had been given fair and sufficient opportunity to 
present his case at trial and has failed to do so with 
required diligence. He should not now be permitted 
to continue his prejudical delays in further dere-
gation of defendants equal rights to justice. 
25 
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POINT III(a) 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE AC-
TION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ADMITTED 
THAT HE HAD NO OTHER EVIDENCE ~oR WIT-
NESSE!S AND: 
(a) THE PLAINTIFF IS N·OT A C·O·MPETENT 
WITNESS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 78-24-2 
(3) U.C.A., 1953. 
Even were it determined by this court that 
the action of the judge in denying a further con-
tinuance was arbitrary, no prejudice can be shown 
thereby because the plaintiff is disqualified as a 
witness in the case under the provisions of Section 
78-24-2, Utah ·Code Annotated, 1953. Plaintiff's 
testimony was objectionable whether tendered per-
sonally or by deposition. The pertinent provisions 
of the section indicated are as follows: 
~~The following persons cannot be wit-
nesses: 
* * * 
"(3) A party to any civil action, suit or 
proceeding clai'ms or opposes . . . or defends 
. . . as the executor or 'administrator of any 
deceased p-erson ... as to any statement by, 
or transaction with, such deceased . . . per-
son, or matter of fact whatever which must 
have been equally within the knowledge of 
both the witness and such ... deceased per-
son, unles's such witness is called to testify 
thereto by such adverse parties so claiming 
or opposing, suing or defending, in such ac-
tion, suit or proceeding." 
26 
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The Utah court has considered this statute 
on frequent occasions, but has not construed it as 
the sa1ne applies to claimed conversations between 
a surviving and deceased party concerning a fatal 
automobile accident. In the case of Maxfield vs. 
Sainsb~try, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. 2d 122, 129, this 
court announced the purpose of the statute as fol-
lows: 
"'The purpose of the statute is to guard 
against the temptation to give false testi-
mony in regard to ,a transaction, which a de-
ceased person, by the surviving party, when 
the transaction is involved in a lawsuit and 
the death has sealed the mouth of the other 
party. Furthermore, the statute seeks to put 
the two parties upon terms of equality in re-
gard to giving evidence of the transaction 
(Citing cases). It was never intended that 
this section should be used for the purpose of 
surpressing truth; on the contrary, the sta-
tute's sole purpose is to prevent the proving 
by false testimony of claims against the es-
tate of a deceased person. 
* * * 
"This section makes incompetent: 
Q' ( 1) A witness who is a party to the 
,action; ... The prohibition of this statute, 
by its express wording, is limited to parties, 
whether plaintiff or defendant, who are op-
posing or suing the executor in the imme-
diate action; that is, to those who are the 
parties in the suit adverse to the executor." 
The Court further held that the statute dis-
qualifies the witness and not the testimony. 
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Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion, indi-
cated th·at the purpose stated in the majority opinion 
was too limited, and that it is better expressed in 
the statement of the court to the effect that: 
"The statute seeks to put the two parties 
upon terms of equality in regard to giving 
evidence in the transaction.'' 
A further examination of the Utah ''Dead M'an 
S1tatute" authored by Justice Wolfe, appears in 13 
Rocky 'Mountain Law Review, 2'83, 292 (1941), 
and is republished in 13 Utah Bar Bulletin (July-
August, 1941). In determining those parties to 
whom the prohibition applies the following language 
is pertinent: 
"The test is not whether the deceased 
and survivor would have had the same im-
pressions or understanding of the transaction 
or retain the same memory. That would de-
pend on their faculties. The test is, were they 
equally exposed to the trans~action, or equal 
particip.ants in it? And the statute cancels off 
the survivor when death cancels off the other, 
even though there may be others neither par-
ties nor interested who witnessed the trans-
action." 
The author concludes: 
''Only those witnesses are disqualified 
who are either a party, ·a person directly in-
terested, or one through whom such party or 
interested person derives his interest. The 
party can be either plaintiff or defendant ... 
"All statements a11d transactions are 
2R 
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within the qualification if within the knowl-
edge of both deceased and the surviving party 
... 'equally with the knowledge of survivor 
and decedent' does not mean that it must be 
within their exclusive knowledge. Others may 
have been witnesses and testify unless they 
come within the rule as to incompetency." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
"Transaction" as used in the section cited, has 
been held by those courts considering similar provi-
sions to include within that term, automobile acci-
dents. In the case of Stephens vs. Short, 285 P. 797, 
798, (Wyo., 1930), the Supreme Court of Wyoming 
applied the prohibition to a plaintiff who was the 
survivor of an automobile accident. 
"The word 'transaction' as used in such 
a statute is a very broad term and has been 
used to embrace 'every variety of affairs 
'vhich can form the subject of negotiations, 
interviews or actions between two parties, and 
includes every rnethod by which one party can 
derive impressions or information from the 
con·duct, condition or language of another." 
(Citing Authority). 
Similarly, the Nevada court in the recent case 
of Zeigler vs. Moore, 335 P. 2d 425, 429, 430 (Nev., 
1959), followed a similar construction. In that case 
plaintiff brought suit against one Christ for dam-
ages allegedly resulting from the latter's negligent 
operation of his automobile. Before the trial, the 
defendant died, and his administrator was substi-
tuted as party defendant. 
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In construing a statute similar to the Utah 
provision, the court stated: 
"The overwhelming weight of authority 
supports the rule th·at the dead man's statute 
applies to actions ex delicto and that such 
actions are embraced within the statutory 
use of the word 'transaction'". (Citing auth-
ority). 
" . . . ('T) he term 'transaction' is con-
sidered broader than 'contract' and broader 
than 'tort' although it might include either 
or both." 
The purpose of 'the rule is to : 
"Prevent the living from obtaining un-
fair advantage because of the death of the 
other ... Nor shall the living be entitled to 
the undue advantage of giving his own un-
contradicted and unexplained account of what 
transpired beyond possibility of contradiction 
by the decedent (Citing cases) . The whole 
object of the code provision is to place the 
living and dead on terms of equality, and, 
the dead not being able to testify, the living 
shall not." (Citing cases) 
"The object of the statute is to prevent 
one interested party from giving testimony 
when the other party's lips are sealed by 
death (Citing authority)." 
The Court held that the limits wi'thin which 
a party can testify concerning the "transaction" 
must be drawn by the trial court in applying the 
provisions of the statute. The "equal knowledge pro-
vision" would not appear to preclude a plaintiff's 
30 
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description of her own actions "prior to the point 
when within limitations of time or space the de-
cedent could have contradicted her testimony of his 
own knowledge." See also In re Mueller's Estate, 
89 NW 2d 137 (Neb. 1958), wherein a full discus-
sion of this matter is contained. 
It is submitted that the purpose of the Dead 
Man's Statute as contained in the Utah law, as 
stated in the Maxfield Ca,se, is consistent with the 
views expressed by the Nevada and Wyoming courts, 
an·d also by the majority of other courts, which have 
considered the question. 
In the instant case, the application of this 
doctrine becomes important because the plaintiff's 
attorney admitted that the only testimony or evi-
dence supporting the plaintiff's claim was that of 
the plain tiff ( R. 90) . 
The statute does not preclude the presentation 
of other testimony by witnesses who are not dis-
qualified under the provisions of the Utah Statute 
where such is available; however, the wisdom and 
equity of the statute under consideration is brought 
into focus by the facts of the instant case. Were 
the plaintiff permitted to testify to the "transaction" 
between himself and the deceased, which was equally 
within their knowledge, his testimony would be un-
contradicted because death has sealed the lips of Dr. 
Fulstow, who was the only person who could chal-
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lenge the veracity of any statement made or claimed. 
The statute is not unfair, but merely places the 
plaintiff under the same burden to presecute as the 
defendants are under to defend. 
Accordingly, the p'laintiff, in any event would 
have been precluded from testifying concerning the 
events of the accident, which were equally within 
the knowledge of both parties and which were essen-
tial to the establishment of his case. Therefore, 
Plaintiff could not have been prejudiced in any event 
by the court failing to grant a further continuance 
of the trial date. 
POINT III(b) 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE AC-
TION BECA·USE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ADMITTED 
THAT HE HAD NO OTHER EVIDENCE OR WI~ 
NESSE'S AND: 
(a) * * * 
(b) PLAINTIFF'S CASE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED WITHOUT "COMPETENT SATISFAC-
TORY E'VIDENCE" SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE 
PLA'INTIFF'S ·OWN TESTI'M·ONY. 
The Utah Legislature places a restriction upon 
the evidence necessary to establish recovery under 
·a wrongful death action. Section 78-11-12 U.C.A., 
1953, provides: 
"Causes of ·action arising out of physical 
injury to the person or death, caused by the 
wrongful act or negligence of another, shall 
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, 
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and the injured person, or the personal rep-
resentative or heirs of one meeting death, ·as 
above stated, shall have a cause of action 
against the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoers; provided, however, that the in-
jured person or the personal representatives 
or heirs of one meeting death shall not re-
cover judgment except upon some competent 
satisfactory evidence, other than the testi-
mony of said injured person. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff admitted to 
the court ( R. 90) , that he had no further evidence 
except that of the plaintiff's personal testimony to 
substantiate his claim ·against the defendant ad-
ministrators. In view of the statute an·d the restric-
tions placed upon recovery under the wrongful death 
provision of the statute, the plaintiff's action was 
properly dismissed for lack of "competent, satis-
factory evidence other than the testimony of" the 
plaintiff. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that 
the plaintiff could not have been prejudiced by the 
court's refusal to grant a third motion for trial con-
tinuance, because the na;ture of his evidence would 
have precluded a recovery 1n any event. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID N'OT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIF·F'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE IN VENUE. 
The plaintiff assigns as error the failure of the 
trial court to grant a Motion for Change of Venue. 
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The plaintiff cannot validly complain that he was 
prejudiced by such a denial because the case was 
never submitted to a jury for determination. 
In any event it is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court to determine whether or not a 
fair ·and impartial trial can be had in the county 
designated in the complaint. State vs. Certain Intoxi-
oating Liquors, 53 Utah 171, 177 P. 235; Anderson 
vs. Johnson, 1 Utah 2d 400, 404, 268 P. 2d 427 
(1954). The following language is taken from the 
latter opinion: 
"The sufficiency of evidence to justify a 
change of place of trial is a matter that lies 
in the discretion of the trial court ~and will 
not be disturbed or set aside unless the record 
discloses a clear an·d positive abuse of discre-
tion ... A trial court's ruling on such a mat-
ter will not be considered to have been an 
abuse of discretion unless the court acted un-
fairly, or by whim or caprice or practically 
denied justice in the case. 
"Our statute is so worded that it neces-
sarily is left to the option of the trial court, 
in all cases involving prejudice of the people 
locally, to decide whether conditions are such 
that the requirement of justice would be best 
served by a change. 
"The necessities for the promotion of 
justice require that a wide latitude should be 
allowed the trial court in passing upon an 
application for a change of place of trial on 
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" ... the burden is upon the party who 
assails the ruling of the court to establish 
it ·as error, and as prejudicial, and the matter 
is one strictly within the court's discre-
t . " lOll. • • 
It was the plaintiff who selected the forum in 
which this action was to be tried, even though other 
forms were available to him. Although the case had 
been previously continued on two occasions, the 
plaintiff for the first time filed a Motion for Change 
of Venue on the morning of trial, September 20, 
1961. The motion h·ad not been previously served on 
counsel (R. 50). Plaintiff's counsel admitted that 
a signed petition had been procured on September 
2nd, nearly three weeks before the trial date. The 
petition stated in effect that a certain traveling 
salesman had vi'sited service stations in and 'about 
the area and that certain individuals had stated that 
Dr. Fulstow was killed and the plaintiff was the 
driver of the car and he, too, should have been 
killed ( R. 62, 3'4-38) . 
The motion was not timely made in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 6(d) U.R.C.P. Defend-
ants had no opportunity to investigate the allega-
tions contained in the "petition" which the plain-
tiffs had filed in support of the motion. Further, 
the petition did not meet the requirements of an 
affidavit, which Rule 6 (d) contemplates being filed 
in support of such a Motion. Under the provisions 
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of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., which deals with Summary 
Jud·gment, the form of an affidavit filed in support 
thereof is set out. The requirement is as follows: 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissable 
in evidence, and shall show ·affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein . . ." 
The following is quoted from Rule 43 (e) 
U.R.C.P.: 
''When a motion is based on facts not 
appearing of record, the court may hear the 
matter on affidavits presented by the respect-
d t . " e par 1es, . . . 
The petition which was filed in support of this 
motion for change of venue contained hearsay of 
the most flagrant kind. The statements were not 
based upon personal information of anyone who 
would have been competent to testify in court. None 
of the petitioners were produced in court in sup-
port of the document. Even were it established that 
some of the individuals whose names appeared in 
the petition had something m·aterial or competent 
to say concerning the m'atter under consideration, 
the form of the petition prevented its proper pre-
sentation because by the petition each presumed to 
testify on oath concerning exactly the same facts 
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as every other petitioner. That 28 people could so 
testify challenges the understanding of even the 
most gullible. 
The plaintiff's assignment of error that a fair 
jury could not be had in Kane County is most effec-
tively countered by the fact that a jury was in fact 
impaneled following voir dire ex·amination. The 
fact that an unbiased jury was imp~aneled after ob-
jection is most eloquent proof that a fair trial could 
have been had in the county. Chamblee vs. Stokes, 
9 Utah 2d 342, 244 P. 2d 980 ( 195'9). 
It is submitted that no error was committed in 
failing to grant the Motion of Change of Venue be-
cause: 
1. The motion was untimely made. 
2. It was not supported by proper affidavits. 
3. There was no showing that prejudice would 
result by proceeding with the trial in the County. 
4. An impartial jury was in fact impaneled. 
5. The case was not submitted to the jury 
for determination and no possible prejudice could 
have resulted to the plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Court did not abuse 
its discretion in failing to grant the motion re-
questing a third continuance of the tri'al of the 
above entitled cause, or in failin·g to grant the plain-
tiff's untimely motion for change of venue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAN80N & BALDWIN & 
MERLIN R. L YBBER·T 
51'5 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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